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WELCOME AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
SEAN GRIFFITH: Welcome everyone. My name is Sean Griffith.
I’m the T.J. Maloney Chair in Business Law here at Fordham and
Director of the Fordham Corporate Law Center. It’s my great pleasure to
welcome you to the Fourteenth Annual Albert A. DeStafano Lecture on
Corporate Securities and Financial Law. We’re delighted to have former
Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Myron T. Steele here to give
tonight’s lecture on “Continuity and Change in Delaware Corporate Law
Jurisprudence.” I want to thank you all for coming, especially to the
many members of our board of advisors that I see tonight. Also the
Becker Ross Law Firm and Howard Justvig who’s in attendance tonight.
The many students that I see, thank you. The alums who are here as
well. And of course, I have to thank Ann who is floating around here
somewhere without whom we couldn’t do anything here at the
Corporate Center. I’ll be introducing Justice Steele shortly.
The Corporate Center is grateful for the sponsorship of the Becker
Ross firm in establishing this lecture for their former partner Albert A.
DeStefano. Albert DeStefano started at Fordham Law School as an
evening student. He worked during the day and still managed to make
Law Review and graduate at the top of his class. He went on to become
a partner at the Becker Firm, specializing in corporate matters,
particularly mergers and acquisitions. In his spare time, he devoted
himself to charitable causes and worked here as an adjunct professor,
sharing his enormous knowledge and experience with our students.
Albert passed away in 2012, but through this lecture, he continues to
inspire passion for corporate practice in others. In his honor, we’re
thrilled to welcome to deliver the Fourteenth Annual Albert A.
DeStefano Lecture former Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice
Myron T. Steele.
Justice Steele graduated from the University of Virginia and
received both his J.D. and LL.M. from the University of Virginia School
of Law. He served on active duty in the U.S. Army and retired as a
Colonel in the Delaware Army National Guard. He began his legal
career in Delaware with the firm of Prickett, Jones, and Elliott of
Wilmington and Dover, where he remained for eighteen years,
eventually becoming a litigation partner. He’s a twenty-five year veteran
of the Delaware Judiciary. In 2000, he was appointed to Delaware’s top
court and became the Chief Justice in 2004, just stepping down from
that role at the end of last November.
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While he was on the bench, Justice Steele published more than
three hundred opinions involving disputes among members of limited
liability companies, limited partnerships, shareholders, and managers of
publically traded and closely held corporations. He was highly regarded
among his colleagues as a consensus builder and successfully balanced
board authority with shareholder rights. While he presided over the
court during one of the most dramatic periods of change in corporate
law, the court sometimes gave more latitude in the obligations of board
members to their investors and sometimes enforced very large damages
claims where directors had ignored important conflicts of interest.
Beyond his work in the courtroom, Justice Steele speaks and
frequently writes on issues of corporate governance and corporate law,
including a brilliant 2005 article in the Business Lawyer entitled “On
Corporate Law Federalism: Threatening the Thaumatrope.”1 He loves to
tell people about the Thaumatrope. The Chief Justice previously taught
at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and currently teaches at
Pepperdine Law School in the winter and the University of Virginia
Law School where he’s a regular member of the faculty. Justice Steele
has consistently appeared in annual lists of leading lawyers in America
and top judges in America. He’s served as the President of the
Conference of Chief Justices of the United States and as a Chairman of
the Board of Directors of the National Center for State Courts. In
October 2012, he received the Judicial Leadership Award from the U.S.
Chamber Institute for Legal Reform. It’s a pleasure to have Justice
Steele with us tonight. Please join me in welcoming him to Fordham
Law School.

1. Sean J. Griffith & Myron T. Steele, On Corporate Law Federalism:
Threatening the Thaumatrope, 61 BUS. LAW. 1 (2005).
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LECTURE: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW
JURISPRUDENCE
CHIEF JUSTICE STEELE: Thank you very much Professor
Griffith. In the spirit of candor, something with which all Delaware
Lawyers are constantly either at odds or reminded of, the article that
Professor Griffith talked about was co-authored by Professor Griffith
and myself.2 We won’t talk about who did most of the thinking or who
did most of the writing, but I’m not going to let him get away without
taking credit. The Thaumatrope was his idea, it took him awhile to
explain it to me, but after he got through to me, I completely bought into
the entire thesis.
It’s a privilege to be here tonight, to be a part of this lecture series,
and to be at Fordham Law School. One of my favorite law clerks when I
was on the Supreme Court is a Fordham Law School graduate, Nate
Emertiz. You should be very proud of him, the job he did for the court,
and the lawyer that he has become in Delaware. For all the students
here, you could look no further to find a better example of a graduate of
Fordham who has excelled in the corporate law arena in a state that’s
known for its corporate law.
Well, let me begin by suggesting that the following quote is a
recurring theme, not just of this address, but in my mind throughout my
entire career involved in corporate law. And it’s very appropriate
because I’m quoting Justice Brandeis, someone from New York. He
said, “that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as
a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country.”3 Although he said this in a dissent, these
are words that I always remember and repeat as often as I can. And
whenever I can make a Federalist statement like that and attribute it to
Justice Brandeis and the City of New York, I’m not missing the
opportunity.
As Professor Griffith pointed out, I’m no longer Chief Justice. I
told him, “if you ask me to do it on this date, I will no longer be what he
referred to as a quote ‘distinguished jurist.’” I told him “there’s a risk
that on March 6, 2014 I might not be a jurist any longer.” That’s the bad
news—I’m not the Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court
2.
3.

Id.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 387 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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anymore. The good news, particularly for this lecture, is that I can draw,
nevertheless, on forty-three years of practice, twenty-five years as a
judge, and comment far more freely on trends developing in the
Delaware courts related to the internal governance of Delaware
corporations than I ever could when I was a Vice Chancellor or Chief
Justice.
My objective tonight is in part to inform, but primarily to be
provocative. What I want to do in this lecture is to draw your attention
to what I believe will be predictable changes in corporate governance
that applies to the internal affairs of Delaware corporations and explain
why I think the changes are going to happen. If you disagree with those
predictions, I welcome it. I’m just trying to help you think about what
will happen going forward.
There are in fact changes afoot and not just because of substantial
personnel changes at the highest level on the courts. I swore in our new
Chief Justice, Leo Strine, last week. We will shortly have a new
Chancellor, who is taking Chief Justice Strine’s old position. The mere
fact that those two positions are going to change inevitably says there
will be new thinking, maybe not of a different generation, but certainly
from younger people making the decisions. My father was an Army
officer, and he said, “the only thing you can be guaranteed in the Army
is when there’s a new post commander, every one-way street will
immediately be switched to run the other way. All the services in the
chapel will change. The Jewish, the Catholic, and the Protestant services
will all switch times, and worst of all, they’ll change the hours of the
package store.” So there will be changes when leadership changes. But,
I don’t think you’ll see a change in the approach to the application of
doctrinal principles or in the doctrines themselves unless they occur
incrementally and in a way that’s almost entirely predictable and clearly
thoughtful.
Because my time here tonight is limited, I will focus on three areas
that I think bear watching. None are nuanced, none will surprise you,
but I’m going to talk in broader policy terms, rather than slither through
the weeds of individual cases. I suspect the students do enough case
studies in their classrooms, that they don’t need to hear it from me. I do
not intend my remarks to even pretend to be the presentation of an
academic paper. These will be, and I use a non sequitur, reflections on
the future.

354

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XX

FRAMEWORK
The framework is as follows:
First, the impact of ever-increasing multi-forum litigation. What I
like to refer to as the dance for damages and attorney’s fees. You’re
probably aware that in M&A, ninety-six percent of deals in 2012 over
one billion dollars were litigated: 4 sixty-five percent in multi-forum
jurisdictions and only sixteen percent in Delaware Chancery Court
alone, 5 despite the fact that more than fifty percent of the publically
traded corporations of this country are chartered in Delaware.6 The rest
are in various constituency jurisdictions where the plaintiffs believe the
courts will serve their interests.
Second, is the so-called Nevada/Delaware/North Dakota debate, 7
which reflects what Justice Brandeis said. Competition between the
states is exciting in my view. That competition is akin to the competition
between German and English among our founders when they debated
whether or not to have an official language. I don’t know German. It’s
probably a wonderful language to know, but if that’s the debate, it’ll go
the same direction. And I’ll explain why.
And last, the impact of so-called shareholder activism. Whatever
that term may mean to you.
Any one of these topics, in my view, deserve an hour or more, so I
can only highlight the issues. I can’t conceivably exhaust even the issues
that derive from each.
Now a major caveat. I’m not trying to persuade anyone to accept
my view or to agree with my predictions, but after almost twenty years
on Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court and the speaker circuit,
my predictions flow from some firmly held beliefs. So to be fair to you,
you should know the direction from which I come. First, private
ordering shapes better corporate governance than prescriptive legislation
4. See OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION
INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: REVIEW OF 2013 M&A LITIGATION, 2-3
(2014).
5. See ROBERT M. DAINES & OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH,
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: REVIEW OF 2012
M&A LITIGATION, 2-3 (2013).
6. See About Agency, STATE OF DELAWARE: THE OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE FIRST
STATE, http://corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml.
7. Michal Barzuza, Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a Liability-Free
Jurisdiction, 98 VA. L. REV. 935 (2012).
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and regulation. Second, I distrust what I characterize as faith-based
corporate governance. Change may be all the rage, but it must flow from
empirically-based decision making, accompanied by a cost-benefit
analysis because the latter is, in my view, the only thoughtful way to
improve performance. Better performance should be the goal and the
only goal for corporate governance and change in corporate governance.
The benefits that come to the corporate entity and to investors and the
community at large, only occur when corporate governance’s direction
is to improve the performance of the managers, directors, and large
controlling stockholders of our publicly traded corporations. Now let me
start on the three areas with some specificity.
MULTI-FORUM LITIGATION
First, as a litigator one of my favorite topics is multi-forum
litigation. Multi-forum litigation is expensive, disruptive, and likely to
create inconsistent rulings. It also undermines predictability and causes
uncertainty. And in my view and experience, lack of predictability and
uncertainty are the arch-enemies of businesses’ and investors’ interests.
There have been two responses to this ever-increasing problem,
particularly in the M&A arena. The first is the development of the socalled forum selection bylaw or clauses in charters. Such bylaws may be
adopted unilaterally by a board, or a board may propose the bylaw and
then subject it to a stockholder vote. It gives that corporation the
opportunity to decide where a suit, brought on its behalf, should be filed,
which in turn limits the stockholders’ options in where to file the suit.8
The second way is a combined initiative between the conference of
Chief Justices of the United States and the Federal Judicial Conference
to create a template for cooperation between the federal system, which
refers to this litigation as multi-district, and the states, which generally
refer to it as multi-forum or multi-jurisdictional litigation. The template
is now published on the website of the Federal Judicial Center. 9 It’s
intended to suggest to judges how to interact with each other and
litigants in order to lessen the expense and the likelihood of
8. See Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 941-42
(Del. Ch. 2013).
9. Ten Steps to Better Case Management: A Guide for Multidistrict Transferee
Judges, UNITED STATES JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION & FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER (2d Ed. 2014), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/ten-stepsmdl-judges-2d.pdf/$file/ten-steps-mdl-judges-2d.pdf (last visited Dec. 29, 2014).
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unpredictability, uncertainty, and inconsistent rulings. Hopefully, it will
get legs, and trial judges in all areas, not just corporate governance, will
look to this center’s publication to help develop a cooperative and
collegial relationship between jurisdictions.
For years there’s been, at least in Delaware as I understand it, what
I’ve always believed to be, a sensible plan to handle multi-jurisdiction or
multi-forum litigation. What Delaware does is yield where our core
interests are not directly affected. Our new Chief Justice wrote an article
on the subject four months ago and it suggests to me what will happen
going forward in Delaware. 10 The first-filed rule, which applied in
Delaware for many, many years, is archaic. We should look to the best
interest of the stockholders, rather than just go by rote to who filed the
suit first and where. Delaware has two options if the suit is filed in
Delaware, as well as in some other jurisdiction. It can either stay the
Delaware action or dismiss it outright. And Delaware will do one or the
other when the issues presented do not affect a core interest of Delaware
corporate law.
The fundamental issue, I think, going forward in Delaware’s
reflection on multijurisdictional litigation or multi-forum jurisdiction is
when the state’s law might be applied or interpreted for the first time in
a particular context (i.e., a case of first impression). If so, Delaware will
not yield. Delaware courts should be the first, as we see it, to address an
interpretation of the Delaware General Corporation Law or any issues
that arise that are subject to the internal affairs doctrine.11. And we will
respect the same principle for other jurisdictions. We have a system in
Delaware where, under our constitution, questions of law can be
certified from the federal courts, from the high courts of each of the
states, from the SEC, and now from bankruptcy judges directly to the
Delaware Supreme Court.12
Recently the Ninth Circuit certified a question of law to the
Delaware Supreme Court that addressed what happened to extinguished

10. Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Putting Stockholders First, Not the First-Filed
Complaint, 69 BUS. LAW. 1 (2013).
11. See In re First Interstate Bancorp Consol. S’holder Litig., 729 A.2d 851, 865
(Del. Ch. 1998) (explaining that the internal affairs “doctrine states that the
management of the internal affairs of a corporation will be subject to the law of the
state of incorporation”).
12. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(8).
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derivative claims in the event of a merger.13 We thought it was helpful to
sorting out multi-jurisdiction litigation when the Ninth Circuit took the
time to certify the question to the Delaware Supreme Court, rather than
undertake the question themselves. That’s a pragmatic solution and an
alternative I suggest most states should consider. It took an amendment
to our state constitution14 to permit the practice, but it happened, and it’s
beneficial, we think, to the development of Delaware law.
Most importantly, counsel and the courts must work together to
resolve the multi-forum issue. It can’t be solely affected by the chance
of a bad or weak case succeeding in a district that’s unfamiliar with
corporate law. Plaintiffs who have a weak case tend to want to file in a
district where the judges are not familiar with an issue of corporate law.
These judges may get an issue of corporate law once every five or ten
years, or maybe only once in their careers. Alternatively, there are
districts like the Southern District of New York and Delaware where
these issues arise frequently. Plaintiff’s lawyers tend to say when they
have a promising case on the merits, they’ll come to the Southern
District or to Delaware, but when they have a weak case, they’ll go
elsewhere. It’s also in part, and sadly I report, fee-driven. Where are the
plaintiff’s lawyers most likely to excel in achieving a fee for their
efforts? Not always the jurisdiction that is the logical jurisdiction for the
case to be filed.
Now one of the answers I mentioned earlier in the outline—forum
selection bylaws. Forum selection bylaws are largely an idea arising out
of the minds of lawyers at Wachtell Lipton here in New York. As a
matter of contract between stockholders, managers, directors, and the
corporation itself, the corporation’s board of directors under Section 141
of our General Corporation Law manages and directs the affairs of the
corporation.15 They can adopt a bylaw that says for certain cases, suit
can be filed by our stockholders against us or on our behalf only in a
particular state. Now logically, when someone charters in a particular
state, it doesn’t take a rocket scientist to figure out that the benefits
aren’t from a lower franchise tax or from loose accountability standards.
The benefit is from a court system that’s familiar with the issues that
will arise, and a court that is efficient and effective at disposing of those
13. Arkansas Teacher Ret. Sys. v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 75 A.3d 888 (Del.
2013).
14. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(8).
15. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 141(a) (2014).
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issues in a way that’s most cost effective to the parties involved. That’s
what draws the litigation. It makes perfect sense to think in terms of a
forum selection bylaw if it will restrict litigation uniquely focused on the
internal affairs of a corporation to one jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
others. It’s an immediate resolution to the problem of the expense and
inconsistency I mentioned earlier that can arise out of multi-forum
jurisdiction.
Our new Chief Justice recently decided as Chancellor that forum
selection bylaws unilaterally adopted by a board are facially valid under
Delaware law.16 It was left for another day, the question of as applied,
what would the result be after adopting a single foreign selection bylaw?
This question was addressed in a case from the Northern District of
California, which came before this Delaware forum bylaw case. In the
Galaviz case, 17 the Oracle board had adopted unilaterally, a forum
selection bylaw that designated Delaware as the sole place to litigate
derivative suits. Now, derivative suits (i.e. suits brought on behalf of the
corporation) should surprise no one. Logic at least suggests to me that
the corporation should decide where to bring a suit if they are to bring
one. And if you’re bringing it on their behalf, can’t they contract with
you to bring it in a particular state or forum as opposed to others? Well,
the Federal District Court in Northern California said, I’m not sure about
the validity under Delaware law, but I don’t have to decide whether this
is valid under Delaware law. I decide venue and the venue can be in the
Federal District Court in the Northern District of California.18 But more
importantly, whether that conclusion is right or wrong, Justice Richard
Seeborg touched on factors that I think affect “as applied” going
forward. First, the wrongdoing that the board was accused of, the breach
of fiduciary duty, occurred before the board adopted the forum selection
bylaw. The stockholders of course, in order to pursue a derivative suit,
had to own the shares at the time the wrongdoing occurred and had to
continue to own them. So his view was, well it may be, and again, I
don’t have to decide it, he says, valid under Delaware law. I’ll let a
Delaware court decide that. But basically without using the same
language, Justice Seeborg said the same thing that Chief Justice Strine

16. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 954 (Del.
Ch. 2013).
17. Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (N.D. Cal 2011).
18. See id. at 1175.
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issued his caveat about. When the forum bylaw is applied, you may not
be able to successfully implement it.19
So I suggest to you, that whether you adopt a forum selection
clause in a charter, which would be ratified in effect by two thirds of the
stockholders in order to effectively amend the charter, whether the board
adopts it unilaterally as a bylaw, whether you adopt the bylaw then
submit it to stockholders for their approval (another prophylactic to
validate the bylaw), or whether you automatically include a forum
selection clause in your initial charter, you have to focus on how it will
ultimately be applied in a real world scenario. It’s all contextual, so it’s
not an automatic antiseptic that you have a forum selection bylaw. You
have to be careful, even if you have the legal right to adopt it, in the way
in which you apply it to make sure the circumstances to which it applies
fairly treat the stockholders.
Now what really amazes me about this is opposition from the proxy
advisors. These in my view are knee-jerk faith-based corporate
governance inexperts. They oppose all forum selection bylaws, and they
do so because it restricts stockholder options to sue in various forums.
Look, didn’t I just say it’s expensive and disruptive to have multi-forum
jurisprudence or multi-jurisdiction litigation? Why would someone
advising stockholders say you should oppose something that’s going to
lower the cost of your investment. To me, it’s just incomprehensible, but
I’m sure they can explain their rationale for it. Every time I’ve heard
them explain it, I still don’t get it.
But I call to your attention this area of the law moving forward
because it, to me, is very exciting. Whether it is the ultimate solution to
the problem of multi-jurisdictional litigation or not, there’s going to be a
fount of litigation as corporations continue to adopt these bylaw or
charter changes, whether they submit to the shareholders or not, because
it’s all going to focus on how they’re applied in a given situation. And
the points Chief Justice Strine made will be litigable points along the
way. Delaware made its first statement, which is that these clauses are
facially valid, 20 but the litigation is going to focus on how they are
actually applied in various contexts.

19.
20.

See id.
See Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund, 73 A.3d at 954 (holding that a Boardadopted forum selection bylaw governing disputes as to corporation’s internal affairs
was facially valid under the statute).
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SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM
Now, the next part of the framework, shareholder activism. Again,
define it any way you wish. In my preferred system for the world, and I
think in the minds of all Delaware judges, engaged if not antagonistic
stockholders add positive value as a check on director authority and are
a catalyst for corrective accountability, so long as their efforts focus on
improved performance and not the advancement of political or personal
agendas—a major caveat in my view. Delaware courts, it seems to me,
will increasingly recognize the benefits that engaged investors bring to
the table.
Who can ignore the real world de-retailization of stock ownership?
We now know that, as of 2012, institutional investors hold seventy-five
percent of the shares in publicly traded US corporations.21 We also know
that most of these institutional investors either have in-house expertise
or the capacity to hire experts to help them shape their decision-making.
We hope that the expertise leads to their desire to improve performance
and not simply to be disruptive and antagonistic for the reasons that I
suggested earlier.
And I believe that the Delaware courts recognize that stockholder
interests vary. There may be seventy-five percent institutional
ownership, but it is by no means a monolithic block of interest. They’re
not sharing the same views, and they don’t agree on interests and
objectives. They range from long-term investors, like Vanguard or
Fidelity or some passive pension funds, to arbitrageurs, whose
investment window is days, maybe sometimes hours, and certainly not
what some people euphemistically call the long-term of three to five
years. But they are highly sophisticated.
I think, as case law moves forward in Delaware, institutional
investors will continue to be able to act under Delaware law in their own
interest. This will continue to be the case despite some suggesting the
image of sharks circling a bloody carcass in the water. And as Chief
Justice Strine, in my view, famously said recently in a case, well
actually it said to the lawyers in a transcript and not in an opinion, “what
troubles you about sharks circling in the water? There is, after all, a

21. Frank Aquila & Jinhee Chung, As Institutional Investor Influence Grows: Is
Now the Time for Shareholder Engagement?, Bloomberg BNA (Jan. 25, 2013),
http://www.bna.com/as-institutional-investor-influence-grows-is-now-the-time-forshareholder-engagement/.
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bloody carcass there and you have to expect sharks to circle the
carcass.” The wolf pack theorists, where aggressive investors get
together in a block interest and frustrate the interest of the balance of the
stockholders and the corporation itself, is another characterization.
Delaware, I think, will continue to protect the sacrosanct
shareholder franchise from board or management interference. I think
we’ll continue the policy of allowing stockholders who are not
controllers to vote in their own interest without imposing fiduciary
duties on them regardless of their shark or wolf pack mentality. They’ll
still be able to vote and act in their own best interest, regardless of
motive.
But there are issues that need to be resolved. Let me call the Air
Products and Chemicals v. Airgas case to your attention.22 In that case,
there was a hostile tender offer, which the board opposed, and both a
poison pill and a staggered board—powerful defensive weapons against
an unwelcomed hostile tender offer. The board decided that the final
tender offer fell below the fair value of the corporation’s shares. They
estimated fair value to be in the range of $120. So, they kept the pill in
place and fought a slate at a board election committed to remove the
staggered board. A majority of the board concluded that they would
trigger the pill and frustrate the tender offer if they must. Chancellor
Chandler said at the end of the day, I’m constrained by the doctrine in
Delaware of substantive coercion, which you probably know is the
theory that the board is there to protect the stockholders from
themselves because they may do the wrong thing.23 This is troubling to
me. They may tender at $70 (then a substantial premium to market)
when the board had analyzed the value of the shares to be $78 in the
long term, even though it was trading in the mid $40s at the time the $70
tender offer was put forth.24 His frustration with the constraint I think
resulted from what I just talked about. He knew that most of those
stockholders were institutional stockholders.
Substantive coercion was developed in the 1960’s and 1970’s when
the majority of stockholders were retail stockholders (and perhaps poor
investors, like my wife and myself, who didn’t know what the heck they
were doing, but they invested anyway because it seemed fashionable).
The doctrine was designed to protect them from ill-advised and hasty
22.
23.
24.

Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del Ch. 2011).
Id. at 108.
Id. at 56.
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uninformed judgments. Chancellor Chandler declined to remove or
enjoin the pill because he had to rule consistent with precedent. But he
observed the doctrine has limited value to the court under
circumstances, as he saw it, where all the information that was material
to stockholder decision making was in the public domain or came out
through the course of the litigation, and the directors admitted that the
stockholders had all the information they needed to exercise rational
judgment.25 Isn’t there a point in time where the court should enjoin the
pill? Shouldn’t the stockholders be able to decide freely, without the
threat of a pill, to accept or reject the tender offer?
The court should no longer rely on substantive coercion as a basis
to keep the pill in place. I predict to you it’s only a matter of time before
substantive coercion is history. Because when you have a seventy-five
percent institutional stockholder base, it’s not like you’re their guardian.
They’re perfectly capable of making their own decisions and you can’t
segregate stockholders and say, “Well, I’m going to protect the five
percent retail stockholders here,” or “I don’t like the five percent
arbitragers and the balance are institution investors.” Under Delaware
law, you can’t segregate shareholders’ interests. You have to treat them
all as shareholders.
So my prediction is, if that issue comes to the Delaware Supreme
Court, and it did not in Air Products, that the result would be different.
Going forward you’ll see substantive coercion disappear. But that
doesn’t mean the problem has disappeared. There are still issues.
Minority investor board members, whether they’re there by election or
agreement, have issues of dual loyalty. The aggressive activist
stockholder wants their people on the board. Once they’re on the board
and they’ve been put there as the result of the action of an activist
shareholder, to whom do they owe fiduciary duties of loyalty?
Traditional Delaware law says you owe it to the corporation.26 As soon
as you get on that board, no matter from whence you come, your duties
of loyalty and care, and to exercise them in good faith, are owed to the
corporation and to its stockholders. Not to the entity that may have
elected you to the board, which may be only one in a multifaceted group
of stockholders.

25.
26.

Id. at 78.
R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSIE A. FINKELSTEIN, DUTY OF LOYALTY, DEL. L. OF
CORP. AND BUS. ORG. § 4.16 (Wolters Kluwer 2015).
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Vice Chancellor Laster is one of the smartest people I know, and I
said that when I didn’t have to appear before him. He suggested in a
speech recently that it’s time to just understand that the world is
different today, and there will be dual loyalties, and you’ll just have to
decide whether that duty of loyalty under a particular contextual
circumstance could be contemporaneously owed and discharged to both,
or whether it was discharged improperly as to one.27 But, in his words,
don’t continue this prejudice against activist stockholder board seats and
those who hold them. Very interesting concept. It is out there compared
to current Delaware law, but that may be the direction that we’re going.
Another issue that arises out of the dual loyalty problem is
confidentiality. You can enter into confidentiality agreements, but how
do you comply with a confidentiality agreement if you owe a duty of
loyalty to the person with whom you’re barred from sharing? That
hasn’t been sorted out. I have no idea how it will be sorted out, but it is a
very tricky and very difficult question.
Finally, I want to talk about, the recent investment banker cases, El
Paso,28 Del Monte,29 and Southern Peru30 and debunk the thought that
the Delaware judges are attempting to regulate the investment banking
industry and that lawyers simply don’t “get” conflicts the way
investment bankers understand and live with conflicts. All the Delaware
courts are doing in those cases and of course, I assume you have
knowledge about those cases, is saying that boards, in order to carry out
their duty of loyalty and care appropriately, should make a fulsome
investigation into the existence of conflicts with investment bankers and
then disclose those conflicts. While they may still wish to hire
investment bankers despite their conflicts, they must disclose their
rationale for doing so to stockholders. It is not an indictment of
investment bankers. It is not an attempt to tell investment bankers how
to run their business. The Delaware judges fully understand that a
lawyer’s conception of what constitutes a conflict is not the same as an
investment banker. And there are certainly times in the multi-limited
partnership arena, such as the publicly traded master limited

27. J. Travis Laster, The Effect of Stockholder Approval on Enhanced Scrutiny, 40
Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1443, 1452-53 (2014).
28. In re El Paso Corp. S’holders Litig., 41 A.3d 432 (Del Ch. 2012).
29. In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813 (Del. Ch. 2011).
30. In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S’holders Derivative Litig., 52 A.3d 761 (Del. Ch.
2011).
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partnerships that deal in the oil and gas industry, where there are a
limited number of investment bankers that they can turn to in the first
place.
So there will be conflicts. The point is the board, in order to
discharge its fiduciary duties, needs to find out about the conflicts,
assess them, make a reasonable business judgment about whether to still
use that investment banker, and disclose that conflict and what they’ve
done about it to their stockholders before they ask the stockholders to
vote on an acquisition or a sale.
Watch for a case called Rural Metro,31 which is to be decided by
Vice Chancellor Laster. It’s been under advisement now for a period of
time. He’s doing the ninety-day dance. We have a rule in Delaware that
all cases must be decided within ninety days of submission.32 It could
have been decided today for all I know while I was on the train coming
here, but watch for that case, because there’s a really significant issue.
You all know that under most state law and certainly Delaware,
directors can be exculpated from breaches of their duty of care. But
when it’s established that they have breached their duty of care, there
may be no damages assessed to them because they’re exculpated. But,
what if there’s a corresponding complaint against the investment
bankers completely subsumed by the same facts on an aiding and
abetting theory? The law says you can’t be an aider and abettor unless
there’s an underlying breach. 33 But, what about when there’s an
underlying breach that’s been exculpated? Is it still a breach? If a tree
falls in the woods, does it still make a noise? That’s what he’s going to
answer in Rural Metro. It’s a hugely significant issue because the
investment banks throughout this country are highly apprehensive about
the possibility that an underlying board breach of fiduciary duty for
which directors are exculpated could nevertheless result in damages
arising out of an aiding and abetting theory being assessed against
investment banks or other financial advisors.

31.
32.
33.

In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014).
Del. Supr. Ct. Administrative Directive No. 175 (2010).
In re Rural Metro, 88 A. 3d at 97.
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NEVADA, DELAWARE, AND NORTH DAKOTA DEBATE
Finally, in my view, the best model for corporate governance is a
fluid, not a static, one. So I turn to define three templates—the so-called
Nevada, Delaware, and North Dakota debate.
I’m going to assume that everybody pretty much understands what
Nevada has added to the competition for better corporate governance.
I’ll give them the benefit of the doubt, I’ll call it a competition for
charters. Nevada has said we are going to allow charters to exculpate
directors for breaches of duty of loyalty.34 A concept that would never
will be allowed in Delaware. That puts them firmly, in some people’s
view, on the right in this balancing of authority and accountability, a
radical shift from traditional fiduciary duty law. Delaware remains in the
middle. We’re trapped by Section 141 that says directors and no one
else manages and directs the affairs of the corporation, 35 but we’re
sensitive to stockholder rights and we hold directors accountable when
they breach their fiduciary duty of loyalty or when they act with a
conscious disregard of a known duty, which is our definition of a lack of
good faith.
And then there’s North Dakota. In 2007, North Dakota adopted the
entire smorgasbord of faith-based corporate governance. 36 Everything
you could think of-all twenty-two of the items being discussed in the
academic world and in the marketplace. I won’t go through them all, but
if you chartered under North Dakota’s special section of their
corporation law, you must separate the office of chairman and CEO.37
Whether it was in the best interest of the corporation or not, there was
just this assumption that it had to be because the faith based madrassas
that come up with these ideas of what constitutes corporate governance
said it was. Majority voting. No staggered boards. Proxy access,
although that’s been frustrated by the SEC, no one can have proxy
access now. But they were offering at the time, the same terms that were
going to be eventually proposed in one of the five bills that resulted in
watered down Dodd-Frank.
Now, I personally think it’s fabulous that all those alternatives are
offered. But if you see it as the left wing view in the competition for

34.
35.
36.
37.

NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138(7) (2014).
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2014).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35 (2007).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-06.
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charters, well it’s not working out so well. North Dakota had two
publicly traded corporations in 2007,38 when they adopted everybody’s
wish list of faith based corporate governance. And just two remain.39 So,
no vote has yet gained a majority to move from Delaware to North
Dakota in order to take advantage of faith based corporate governance.
Stockholders see the smorgasbord for what it is.
However, Nevada worries me for one important reason. If you
move too far in protecting directors and frustrating the Common Law
Fiduciary Duty regime that’s been in place for hundreds of years, you
run the risk of political entities and constituencies going to the federal
government and inviting that institution’s meddling. Meddling with all
the adverse consequences typically flowing from the ill-advised
presumption that the Feds can and will do a better job than the states.
History in my view teaches us that federal responses to crises, real or
perceived, often result in an immediate alleged solution developed in an
atmosphere super charged by constituency politics overlaid by the Feds
penchant for refusing to admit mistakes and policy failures that results
in no corrective action or any process designed for careful reevaluation.
CONCLUSION
Delaware’s Common Law incrementally based system will
continue to adapt to accommodate needed change, and the balance of
director authority and accountability will continue to acknowledge
stockholders’ capacity to engage and exercise independent judgment.
The balance may appear to shift on the margins from a director-centric
model, but the shift will be more glacial than lightening striking. An
occasional case will perhaps strike fear in the hearts of mankind, watch
carefully for Rural Metro. But Delaware will largely remain thoughtful,
predictable, and informed by facts and business practices. As far as
change is concerned, that’s how it has been, that’s what it will be, and in
my opinion, that’s how it should be. Thank you very much.

38. Joshua P. Fershee, The North Dakota Publicly Traded Corporations Act: A
Branding Initiative Without a (North Dakota) Brand, 84 N.D. L. REV. 1085, 1085
(2008).
39. Liz Hoffman, Icahn Likes North Dakota for Shareholders, But State Fails to
Draw Public Companies, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Oct. 28, 2013, available at
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304655104579163681660025274.

